This paper studies a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model where parents and their children are linked by bequests, both voluntary and accidental, and by the transmission of earnings ability. This model is able to match very well the empirical observation that households with similar lifetime earnings hold very different amounts of wealth at retirement. Earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints are essential in generating the variation in wealth at retirement among low lifetime earnings households, while inheritance heterogeneity generated by intergenerational links helps to generate the heterogeneity in wealth at retirement among high lifetime earnings households.
Introduction
Many papers document that households with similar characteristics, such as lifetime income, age, and family structure, hold very different amounts of wealth at retirement (see, among others, Hurst, Luoh and Stafford (1998) In particular, Hendricks (2007a) documents that substantial wealth difference remains after controlling for lifetime earnings and age. At all levels of lifetime earnings, there is a large dispersion in the accumulated wealth at retirement: A significant fraction of high earnings households have relatively little wealth, and a substantial fraction of low earnings households have a lot.
In this paper, I quantify how much of the observed heterogeneity in wealth at retirement, after controlling for lifetime earnings, can be generated by a realistically parameterized model with incomplete markets and earnings shocks. The model that I am using mainly incorporates two basic forces, voluntary and accidental bequests, and productivity transmission, into an otherwise standard life-cycle model. 1 In this model, households face uninsurable labor-income risk, uncertain lifetimes, and borrowing constraints in the bonds market. Households save to self-insure against labor income shocks and life-span risk, for retirement, and possibly to leave bequests to their children. Households are ex-ante identical. 2 Wealth difference at retirement remains, after controlling for lifetime earnings, because households differ in the timing of earnings over the life cycle and in the amount and timing of inheritances received.
This incomplete-market model with earnings heterogeneity and inheritance heterogeneity can generate large wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime earnings. The existence of borrowing constraints prevents households from smoothing consumption intertemporally. Two households might have the same lifetime earnings, but one might have positive earnings shocks when young and negative earnings shocks when old while the other has negative earnings shocks when young and positive earnings shocks when old. At retirement, those two households will hold amounts of wealth that differ substantially.
Inheritance adds another source of wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime earnings. Some households might have inherited a large amount of assets.
With a voluntary bequest motive, those who have inherited keep a large amount of assets to leave to their children, thus holding a substantial amount of wealth at retirement.
Some households receive no inheritance and thus own less wealth. Inheritance heterogeneity endogenously determined in the model is not as large as in the data. Yet it is substantial enough to help to generate wealth variation among households with similar lifetime earnings.
I then decompose the effect of earnings heterogeneity and inheritance heterogeneity on wealth heterogeneity in the benchmark model. I find that, differences in the timing of earnings shocks can generate large heterogeneity in wealth at retirement among lower lifetime earnings households, who can rely more on pension wealth since pension wealth is a concave function of lifetime earnings. Differences in the timing and amount of inheritance help to generate large heterogeneity in wealth at retirement among higher lifetime earnings households, who on average receive more inheritances and are more likely to keep assets due to bequest motives.
for example Guvenen (2006) ).
To investigate the importance of voluntary and accidental bequests, I run several experiments. Finally, in a model without bequest, the only source of heterogeneity, the timing of earnings shocks, is not enough to generate the observed wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime earnings.
This paper is related to the literature that examines the implications of different models on wealth dispersions at retirement age. 3 4 SCF has a better coverage of high-earner and high-wealth households than PSID and HRS. However, as is shown in Juster, Smith and Stafford (1999) , and Cagetti (2003) , for lower quartiles, those data sets give similar information.
5 Venti and Wise (2000) use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and also find that, at all levels of lifetime earnings, there is a large dispersion in the accumulated wealth at retirement.
To check the robustness of those findings, Hendricks (2007a) restricts samples to contain only households with similar characteristics. The main findings are not affected by household characteristics such as numbers of children, marital breakups, selfemployment, or stock holdings.
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Those papers' findings thus indicate that households with similar lifetime earnings hold diverse amounts of wealth at retirement age, even when samples are restricted to exclude sources of wealth heterogeneity that are not related to earnings. Those features of the data constitute a challenge to our theories of saving behavior.
The Model
The economy is a discrete-time overlapping generations world with an infinitely-lived government. The government taxes labor earnings, capital income and estates, pays Social Security benefits to retirees, and provides government consumption. There are idiosyncratic earnings shocks. These shocks are uninsurable: The only financial instrument is a one-period bond. Households cannot engage in unsecured borrowing; net assets must be non-negative. There is mortality risk but private annuity markets do not exist.
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Members of successive generations are linked by bequests and the children's inheritance of part of their parent's productivity. At age 20, each agent enters the model and starts consuming, working, and paying labor and capital income taxes. After retirement, the agent no longer works but receives interest from accumulated assets and benefits from Social Security and from defined benefit plan provided by the firm.
Demographics
During each model period, which is 5 years long, a continuum of people is born. Since there are no inter-vivos transfers, all agents start their working life with no assets.
8 I denote age t = 1 as 20 years old, age t = 2 as 25 years old, and so on. At the beginning of period 4, the agent's children are born, and four periods later (when the agent is 55 years old) the children are 20 years old and start working. The agents retire at t = 10 (when they are 65 years old) and die by the end of age T = 14 (before turning 90 years old). From t = 10 (when they are 65 years old), each person faces a positive probability of dying, given by (1 − p t ). The probability of dying is exogenous and independent of other household characteristics. The population grows at rate n.
Government
The government taxes labor earnings, capital income and estates to finance the exogenous public expenditure, G, and to provide Social Security benefits to the retired agents.
Income from labor is taxed at a flat rate τ l . 9 Income from capital is taxed at a flat rate τ a . Government taxes bequests at the rate τ b for the proportion above the exemption level ex b .
The structure of the Social Security system is the following: Retired households receive Social Security benefits from the government each period until they die. The Social Security benefits that individuals receive are linked to their average lifetime earnings according to a piecewise linear function. 8 Data from the HRS suggests that observed inter-vivos monetary transfers are fairly small (Cardia and Ng (2000) ). Given the small size of observed inter-vivos monetary transfers, I doubt that this simplification would affect much the quantitative predictions of my model. 9 In the model, labor earnings are estimated using after-tax earnings. Thus all the progressive features of the tax system are already reflected in the calibrated after-tax earnings distribution. I introduce a constant tax rate τ l to balance the government budget.
Technology
There is one type of good produced according to the aggregate production function
where K is the aggregate capital stock and L is the aggregate labor input. The final goods can be either consumed or invested into physical capital.
Physical capital depreciates at rate δ. Households rent capital and efficient labor units to the representative firm each period, and receive rental income at the interest rate r and wage income at the wage rate w.
The representative firm maintains a defined benefit plan, which is financed by contributions on each work's behalf. 10 All workers face the same contribution rate τ DB .
Retired households receive pensions from defined benefit plan each period until they die. The pension benefits that individuals receive are linked to their average lifetime earnings according to a piecewise linear function. 
.1 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption and from bequests transferred to their children upon death. 12 Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant discount factor β. The momentary utility function from consumption is of the constant relative-risk aversion class given by
Following De Nardi (2004), the utility from bequest b is denoted by
10 In the model, defined contribution pension wealth is equivalent to wealth accumulated through private saving.
11 Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006) propose an alternative model of defined benefit plan, in which pension benefits are linked to individuals' average earnings in the past 5 year before retirement.
12 Note that this form of 'impure' bequest motive implies that an individual cares about the total bequests left to his/her children, but not about consumption of his/her children.
The term φ 1 reflects the parent's concern about leaving bequests to his/her children, while φ 2 measures the extent to which bequests are luxury goods. If φ 2 > 0, the marginal utility of small bequests is bounded, while the marginal utility of large bequests declines more slowly than the marginal utility of consumption.
Labor Productivity
In this economy, all agents of the same birth cohort face the same exogenous ageefficiency profile, t . Each worker i also faces stochastic productivity shocks y i t , which follows a Markov process Q y ln y
This Markov process is the same for all households, so that there is no uncertainty over the aggregate labor endowment. The total productivity of a worker at age t is given by the product of the worker's age-t productivity shock and age-t deterministic efficiency index: y i t t . To capture the intergenerational correlation of earnings, I assume the parent's productivity shock at age 55 is transmitted to children at age 20 according to the following transition function Q yh
What the children inherit is only their first draw; from age 20 on, their productivity y t evolves stochastically according to Q y .
The Household's Recursive Problem
In a stationary equilibrium, the interest rate is constant at r and the wage rate is at w.
13 I assume that children have full information about their parents' state and children solve their decision problems after observing their parents' decisions. Children infer the 13 A formal definition of the stationary equilibrium is provided in Appendix 7.1.
size of the bequests they are likely to receive based on this information. The household's state variables are given by (t, a, y, y, S p ). The first four variables denote the agent's age, financial assets carried from the previous period, the agent's productivity, and cumulated average productivity, respectively. The last term S p denotes the agent's parent's state variables and differs in each of the following four cases.
(i) From t = 1 to t = 2 (from 20 to 25 years of age), the agent survives for sure until next period and does not expect to receive a bequest because his/her parent is younger than 65.
The expected value of the value function is taken with respect to (y , y p ), conditional on (y, y p ). At any subperiod, the agent's resources depend on asset holdings, a, and labor endowment, t y. Asset holdings pay a risk-free rate r and labor receives a real wage w.
Average productivity for children and parents accumulates according to equations (6) and (7), respectively. The law of motion of assets for the parents, which is their decision rule, is given in equation (8).
(ii) From t = 3 to t = 7 (from 30 to 50 years of age), the worker survives for sure until the next period. However, the agent's parent is at least 65 years old and faces a positive probability of dying at any period; hence, a bequest might be received at the beginning of the next period. Let V I (t, a, y, y) and V (t, a, y, y, a p , y p ) denote the value function of a person whose parent is dead and alive, respectively.
subject to (4), (5), and (6). In the latter case,
subject to (5), (6), (8), and
where a + denotes the financial assets at the end of the period before receiving bequests, and b is a function of the parent's state variables.
(iii) The sub periods t = 8 to t = 9 (from 55 to 60 years of age) are the periods before retirement, during which no more inheritances are expected because the agent's parent is already dead by that time. The agent does not face any survival uncertainty. (iv) From t = 10 to t = 14 (from 65 to 85 years of age), the agent does not work and does not inherit any more, but faces a positive probability of dying. In case of death, the agent derives utility from bequeathing his/her assets. Households receive Social Security benefits P ( y) and pensions from defined benefit plan DB( y).
14 In both cases, since parents are retired, productivity for parents, y p , is not in the state space and average productivity for parents, y p , does not change over time. In the former case, a p and y p are not in the state space any more. subject to (5) and The deterministic age-profile of labor productivity t is taken from Hansen (1993).
Calibration
16 15 One period in this model corresponds to 5 years in real life, thus I adjust parameters accordingly. 16 Since I impose mandatory retirement at the age of 65, I set t = 0 for t > 9.
The persistence ρ y and variance σ 2 y of the stochastic productivity process are estimated from PSID data (Altonji and Villanueva (2002) ). 17 The persistence is low and variance is high because this refers to income in a 5-year period. I take persistence ρ yh of the productivity inheritance process from Zimmerman (1992) , and variance σ 2 yh from De Nardi (2004).
The capital income tax τ a is set to be 20% (Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1999)).
The rate τ b is the tax rate on estates that exceed the exemption level ex b . I choose these two parameters from De Nardi (2004) who matches the observed ratio of estate tax revenues to GDP, and the proportion of estates that pay estate taxes. G is total government expenditure and gross investment excluding transfers, and is chosen to be 18% of GDP (Council of Economic Advisors (1998) for 1996).
The Social Security benefit is calculated to mimic the Old Age and Survivor Insurance component of Social Security system:
The bend points, expressed as average earnings, and marginal rates are from Huggett and Ventura (2000).
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I take α, the share of income that goes to capital, to be 0.36 (Prescott (1986) , and Cooley and Prescott (1995) ). I take depreciation to be 6% (Stokey and Rebelo (1995) ).
Given the calibration for the production function, the before-tax interest rate on capital net of depreciation r is 6%. The defined benefit is equal to 
Moment
Target
weight of bequest in utility function −14.6 φ 2
shifter of bequest in utility function 12.7 τ DB Contribution rate to defined benefit plan 5.2% τ l tax on labor income 33%
a The corresponding capital-output ratio in the equilibrium is 2.8. b I use distribution for single decedents instead of the one for all decedents. Typically a surviving spouse inherits a large share of the estate, consumes part of it, and only leaves the remaining to the couple's children. Mean lifetime earnings at each decile, in the data and in the model, normalized by average lifetime earnings, is plotted in Figure 1 . The model does a good job in matching lifetime earnings for each decile reported in the PSID. Lifetime earnings in the HRS, measured by the present value of Social Security earnings, are more evenly distributed than those in the PSID. The extreme low lifetime earnings for the lower two deciles is caused by the fact that some persons in these deciles were employed in sectors not covered by the Social Security system and thus reported zero Social Security earnings.
Distribution of Lifetime Earnings
Lifetime earnings for the highest deciles in the HRS are subject to top-coding and thus are lower than in the PSID. 19 An income process that implies very large earnings risk for the highest-income earners is key in matching wealth dispersion (Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003), and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)). My model misses this key element thus could not match the fraction of wealth held by the richest 1%. Table 5 , row two, compares values for the wealth distribution at retirement for the benchmark economy with the U.S. data. Wealth at retirement is less unevenly distributed than wealth for the whole economy both in the data and in the model: In the benchmark the Gini coefficient of wealth at retirement is 0.62, compared with 0.74 in the whole sample. This shows that a large amount of wealth dispersion in the economy is due to differences in age. The model generates a skewed retirement wealth distribution that is comparable with the data, expect for the top 1% of the wealth holding.
Inheritance Distribution
The general equilibrium model with intergenerational links of bequests and productivity endogenously generates differences in the timing and amount of inheritances. To see how large the variation in inheritance is, Table 6 To see how the inheritances are distributed by lifetime earnings, I present in Table 7 20 The monotonicity relation is weaker in the data. This might due to the fact that, in reality each married individual might receive inheritances multiply times from his/her own parents and from the parents of the spouse. Parental wealth is imperfectly correlated since the degree of assortative matching between spouses is not strong.
Wealth Inequality and Lifetime Earnings
I now look at the relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings. To measure how large are the wealth differences between earnings-rich and earnings-poor households, I show in Figure 2 , the mean retirement wealth at each lifetime earnings decile, normalized by average household after-tax earnings. In the PSID, the earningsrich households on average hold more wealth than the earnings-poor households. The model does a very good job in matching the mean retirement wealth observed in the data for each earnings decile. In this model, households with higher lifetime earnings will save more than households with lower lifetime earnings due to the facts that bequest is a luxury good and benefits from Social Security and from defined benefit plan follow a concave function of lifetime earnings. In the benchmark model with earnings heterogeneity and inheritance heterogeneity, substantial wealth heterogeneity remains after controlling for lifetime earnings and age. Table 8 . Adding random noise weakens the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth slightly. However, the average Gini coefficient barely changes. The reason is that, by grouping households into deciles, rather than looking at each household, some random noise averages out. 
The Effect of Earnings Heterogeneity
In the benchmark model, retirement wealth inequality arises, among household with similar lifetime earnings, because households differ in the timing of earnings over the life cycle and in the amount and timing of inheritance received. Let us now try to understand the effect of earnings heterogeneity on the heterogeneity in retirement wealth.
A simple life-cycle model without earnings uncertainty and without borrowing constraints predicts a perfect correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
Adding earnings uncertainty and borrowing constraints breaks the prefect correlation, since the timing of positive or negative shocks differs among household with identical lifetime earnings.
Suppose two households have the same lifetime earnings, but one has positive earnings shocks when young and negative earnings shocks when old, the other has the reverse.
The household with positive earnings shocks when young would save more in the earlier ages to buffer against negative earnings shocks later. Then he/she suffers negative earnings shocks later, he/she uses assets to finance consumption, resulting in low level of retirement wealth. The household with negative earnings shocks when young anticipates high earnings in the future and would like to borrow to finance consumption but cannot. When he/she gets positive earnings shocks later, he/she saves most of them for retirement, and ends up holding a relatively large amount of wealth at retirement. 1  1  1  1  1  2  3  5  5  Earnings  15  19  21  23  24  51  103  479  448  Assets  0  0  0  0  1  3  13  47  270  508  2 Shocks  3  3  3  2  2  1  0  0  1  Earnings  62  79  91  49  51  24  11  10  22  Assets  0  7  21  40  40  40  34  25  13  3  3 Shocks  3  3  3  3  5  5  5  5  5  Earnings  62  79  91  99  494  495  490  479  448  Assets  0  7  21  40  65  270  508  697  955 1118  4 Shock  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  2  0  Earnings  297  165  191  207  215  104  103  49  10  Assets  0  105  144  197  270  317  317  317  270  168   Table 9 : Simulation of earnings and assets (in $1000) Table 9 , row 1 and 2, show the simulated shocks, 5-year earnings, and assets holding at the beginning of each period for two households in the 3rd earnings decile with the same discounted lifetime earnings of $1, 850, 000. Their parents are identical so their expectations of bequests are the same. Neither of them receives any bequests. But because of the different timing of earnings, the 1st household has retirement assets of $508, 000, 169 times as big as the 2nd household has ($3, 000). Table 9, row 3 Households in all earnings deciles use assets to finance consumption when suffer negative earnings shocks later in life. Households in the lower earnings deciles, use more assets to finance consumption and carry fewer assets into retirement, since they anticipate higher pension wealth relative to current assets. On the contrary, households in the higher earnings deciles, use less assets to finance consumption and carry more assets into retirement, since they anticipate lower pension wealth relative to current assets. We also notice that inheritance heterogeneity plays a more important role for the higher earnings deciles: The difference between two distributions of retirement wealth increases by lifetime earnings decile. For example, those two distributions of retirement wealth for the 2nd earnings decile differ after the 30th percentile, while those two distributions of retirement wealth for the 9th earnings decile differ since the 10th percentile.
The Effect of Inheritance Heterogeneity
One reason is that, since bequest is modeled as a luxury good, households in the high lifetime earnings deciles, holding relatively more wealth, tend to leave more wealth to their offspring by carrying relatively more wealth towards retirement. Households in the low lifetime earnings deciles, holding relatively less wealth and thus less willing to leave bequests, consume more fraction of inheritance before retirement. The other reason is that, as is shown in Table 7 , there is a positive correlation between lifetime inheritance and lifetime earnings: Those who have high lifetime earnings are more likely to inherit large estates.
Decomposition
The benchmark model adds voluntary and accidental bequests into an otherwise standard model. To understand the relative importance of those two features, I run several experiments. Finally, to see how much wealth inequality can be generated by the lifecycle structure when only earnings uncertainty is activated, I turn off all intergenerational links and assume accidental bequests are equally redistributed among 50-year-old people. 21 In each case, I recalibrate β accordingly to target the same wealth-earnings ratio.
Random Bequest
I now look at the model where parents do not care about leaving bequests to their children but there is intergenerational transfer of productivity. Accidental bequests, if any, are inherited by the children of the deceased. 
No Intergenerational Links
In the model without intergenerational transfer of bequests and earnings ability, accidental bequests are equally redistributed, thus the only source of heterogeneity is the timing of earnings shocks. Table 10 
Conclusions
Empirical studies using micro data find that there is large heterogeneity in retirement 
Appendix
7.1 Definition of the stationary equilibrium I focus on an equilibrium concept where factor prices and age-wealth distribution are constant over time. Each agent's state is denoted by x. An equilibrium is described as follows.
Definition 1 A stationary equilibrium is given by government tax rates, transfers, and spending (τ l , τ a , τ b , ex b , P ( y), G); an interest rate r and a wage rate w; defined benefit policies (τ DB , DB( y)); value functions V (x), allocations c(x), a (x); and a constant distribution of people m * (x), such that the following conditions hold: (i) Given government tax rates and transfers, the interest rate, the wage rate, and defined benefit policies, the functions V (x), c(x) and a (x) solve the described maximization problem for a household in a state x.
(ii) m * is the invariant distribution of households over the state variables for this economy.
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(iii) All markets clear.
(iv) The price of each factor is equal to its marginal product.
(vi) The defined benefit pension budget is balanced at each period.
I t>9 DB( y)m * (dx) = τ DB wL.
(vii) The government budget is balanced at each period.
G+ I t>9 P ( y)m * (dx) = τ a r am * (dx)+τ l wL+ τ b (1−p t )I t>9 max(a −ex b , 0)m * (dx).
Computation of the Model
I discretize both the productivity and the productivity inheritance processes to six-state Markov chains according to Tauchen and Hussey (1991) . Since I want the possible realizations for the initial inherited productivity level to be the same as the possible realizations for productivity during the lifetime, I choose the quadrature points jointly for the two processes 22 I normalize m * so that m * (X) = 1, which implies that m * (χ) is the fraction of people alive that are in a state χ.
The transition matrices also induce an initial distribution of earnings.
The distribution of accumulated productivity at each age is approximated on a grid of 36. The state space for asset holdings is discretized. Using this grid, I can store the value functions and the distribution of households as finite-dimensional arrays.
For a given set of parameters, I solve for the steady state equilibrium as follows:
1. Guess an initial value of τ l and τ DB , and interest rate r, use the equilibrium conditions in the factor markets to obtain the wage rate w.
2. Solve the approximated optimal consumption and saving plans recursively. 3. Guess an initial joint distribution of parents and children at the beginning of the life cycle, compute the associated stationary distribution of households.
4. Compute the implied joint distribution of parents and children at the beginning of the life cycle. If the distributions converge, go to step 5; otherwise go to step 3.
5. Given the stationary distribution and prices, check weather all markets clear and weather the government budget and defined benefit pension budget are balanced. If so, an equilibrium is found. If not, go to step 1.
